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AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: A PRICE ENDOGENOUS ANALYSIS 
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Abstrak 
Sektor pertanian memegang peranan yang penting di Jawa Timur, selama hampir 25 tahun ini. 
Untuk terus mempertahankan peranan tersebut, berbagai kebijaksanaan pert.anian telah dilaksanakan 
di propinsi ini. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengevaluasi kebijaksanaan tersebut dan mempelajari 
perubahan-perubahan yang terjadi apabila terjadi reformasi dan kebijaksanaan tersebut. "Price endo-
genous mathematical programming sector model" digunakan dalam kajian ini dengan memperhatikan 
perbedaan skala usahatani, tipe lahan, dan alternatif pola tanam. Model ini selanjutnya digunakan 
~Jntuk melihat efek dari perubahan kebijaksanaan yang berkaitan dengan situasi keuangan, harga dan 
kebijaksanaan subsidi. Selanjutnya, dibahas dampak perubahan-perubahan tersebut terhadap per-
ekonomian di propinsi Jawa Timur. Hasil dari kajian ini, menunjukkan adanya perubahan yang cukup 
berarti dari reformasi kebijaksanaan di sektor pertanian terutama akan adanya distribusi yang berbeda 
terhadap pelaku-pelaku ekonomi di sektor pertanian. Hal yang terakhir, barangkali akan lebih menarik 
perhatian pengambil kebijaksanaan. 
INTRODUCTION 
The agricultural sector of East Java played a major role in the economic 
development of Indonesia in the past twenty five years (Altemeier, K. et al., 1987). 
Several forms of agricultural policies have designed dlld implemented to continue 
this contributing role. This study aims to evaluate these policies and to assess the 
impacts of certain policies changes in a price endogenous modelling framework. 
1b achieve the above objectives, a price endogenous mathematical programming 
sector model is used as an analytical tool. Such a model is thought to be the most 
convenient analytical tool since it incorporates the simultaneity in production 
decisions and permits the researcher to analyze the effects of drastic changes in 
policy parameters which fall outside the historical experienced range of variation. 
This approach is well known and has been extensively used in the literature. 
This study presents an original application to the agriculture of East Java where 
agricultural policy issues pertaining to Indonesia are investigated. 
•) Researcher of the Center for Agro-Socioeconomic Research, Bogor. 
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MEmOD OF ANALYSIS 
A price endogenous mathematical programming sector model for East Java 
is used in this study. The price endogenous model was chosen for its flexibility in 
portraying all relevant aspects of the farm unit. Moreover, such a model is more 
suitable for the region, as East Java is a major food production center in Indonesia. 
The model is used to analyze the effects of various agricultural policies such as price 





the level of the kth cropping activity by fth farm group, 
the amount of the jth output supplied by farm f, 
the total amount of jth output supplied by all farms 
the quantity of the ith production factor available to the fth producer' 





= the quantity of the ith production factor required by farm f for one unit 
the kth cropping activity, 
the quantity of the jth output yielded by one unit of the kth cropping 
activity by farm f. 
Using these definitions, and assuming that the demand functions are indepen-
dent of sector activity, the sector model formulation is as follows: 
[SM] Max z. = 
subject to: 
p 




Yjfk Xfk ~ 0 for all j, f ......................................... (3) 
Qj - 7 qjf ~ 0. for all j ...................................................... (4) 
qjf' Xfk• Qj ;a: 0 for all f, j, k 
The objective function no longer represents producer profits. The substitution 
of price-dependent, product demand, and factor supply schedules transforms the 
objective function into a measure of consumers' plus producers' surplus or net social 
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benefit, defined as the area between the demand and supply curves to the left of 
their intersection (Samuelson, 1952; Takayama and Judge, 1971). 
The above model establishes the market equilibrium while maintaining the 
profit maximizing optimality conditions for individual firms under endogenous 
market prices (McCarl, B.A., and Spreen, T.H., 1980; Onal, H., 1985). To see this 
form, the Lagrangian of the sector model [SM]: 
L = z- :E a "f (a·fk Xfk - b·r) + :E 13 ·f (q·f -fk 1 1 1 ifk J J :t k Yjfk Xfk) 
- j7.c "Y j (Qj - 7 qjf) ...................................................... (5) 
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the sector model [SM] are 
represented by the equations below: 
~ = - Cfk - :t a·fk a c:'f + :E 13 Jc:'f YJ·fk ~ 0 for all k, f (6a) axfk i 1 1 j 
aL 
-o 
oX fk = 0 for all k, f .•....................................................... (6b) 
X ftc ~ 0 for all k, f .............................................................. (6c) 
~ ~j = ej - djQ j - "Y j ~ 0 for all j .................................... (7a) 
aL o 
a Qj Q j = 0 for all j . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (7b) 
Qj ~ 0 for all j ..................................................................... (7c) 
3L = "Y j - l3 J'?f ~0 for all j, f .......................................... (Sa) 
aq·f 
. J 
a L q Jf = 0 for all j, f ........................................................ (8b) 
a qjf 
qjf ~Oforj,f ..................................•................................. (Sc) 
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aiflc X0 fk ~ 0 for all i, f .......................... (9a) 
..l!:._ a 0 .f = 0 for all i, f ...................................................... (9b) 
aa if 1 
a 0 if~ 0 for all i, f ........................................................... : ... (9c) 
_i!:_= - q· + a~ jf 1 
:t 
k 
Yjfk Xc fk ~ 0 for all j, f .................... (lOa) 
:~f p01jf = 0 for all j, f .................................................... (lOb) 
f.lo. 
"' Jf ~ 0 for all j, f .............................................................. (lOc) 
7 q 0 'jf ~ 0 for all j ............................... (lla) 
~ 0 j = 0 for all j ......................................................... (llb) 
a'Yj 
'Y 0 j ~ 0 for all j ···························•···································· (llc) 
If Qj > 0, from Equations (7a) and (7b) the dual variable 'Y jO equals the market 
price corresponding to the amount Oj· Furthermore, from Equation (lla), some 
micro units produce the jth good (i.e.,qjf > 0). For those micro units, Equation 
(Sa) holds in strict equality form, which implies that the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier 
~ jfo is also equal to the market price. Then, equation (7a) states the usual marginal 
condition, namely each farm uses the kth production process until total revenue 
calculated at the market prices do not exceed the marginal cost of Xfk. Strict equality 
holds if Xfko > 0. This is consistent with the assumption of competitive flrm 
behavior. Furthermore, if the market price 'Y jo is positive, the total demand equals 
the total supply of the jth commodity, because strict equality holds in Equation 
(lla). This establishes the market equilibrium while satisfying individual flrm 
behavior. 
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POLICY ANALYSIS WITH THE MODEL 
The price endogenous sector model results presented above, and a comparison 
of the model results vis a vis the actual situation reported in the official statistics 
provide confidence about the model relations and the data base used. The model 
is then used to analyze the implications of some changes in agricultural policies in 
East Java including changes in: i) interest rate, ii) amount of loan, iii) reduce or 
phase out input subsidy, and iv) crop specific price policies. Impacts are measured 
With regard to the gross production value of crops, sectoral income by farm 
categories, and consumers' and producers' surplus {as a measure of welfare). The 
rationale of policy analysis are as follows: 
i) Interest rate 
As in many developing countries, credit rates for Government specific crop 
programs in East Java are often criticized for being much lower than a rational 
economic policy would dictate. On one hand, the lending {or administration cost) 
is high due to the high default rates, and on the other hand the government tried 
to maintain low interest rate in order to assist the agricultural sector {Bhargava, 
V.K., 1973; Donald, G., 1976; Dia, B., 1985). From the economic stand point, in 
order to maintain the viability of the credit system, either interest rate has to be 
raised and or the default rates have to be reduced. For example, given the 18 
percent annual default rate in the BRI in 1982, The BRI would have to charge as 
high as 40 percent interest rate in order to attain at least break-even {CAER, 1987). 
Although this interest rates appears to be high for subsidized loans, one needs to 
consider it in order to prescribe an operating line for the bank and thus improve 
the outreach of the program. In this study the following rates are considered: 18 
percent, 24 percent and 30 percent. Normally one would expect the farmer to 
borrow less when the interest rates are high. 
ii) The loan amount 
Most farmers have objected to the increasing interest rate but they are willing 
to pay higher interest rates if the amount of the loan and the interest rate simul-
taneously raised {Hadiwigeno, S., 1974; Dia, B., 1985). In this analysis, first the 
model considers 10 percent increase in institutional loans both to small and large 
farms. Later, 10 percent increase of the loan is considered only for small farms, 
and then for large farms in subsequent experiments. Finally, we analyzed the effect 
of increasing the interest rate to 30 percent, which is the market interest rate, 
combined with the alternative increases in the loan amounts to specified farm groups. 
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iii) Input subsidy 
The government has employed fertilizer subsidy as a key instrument to 
stimulate crop production, particularly rice. The rapid growth in fertilizer use, 
induced in part by subsidy together with the adoption of modem varieties and 
massive investment in irrigation, has sharply increased the budgetary burden of 
subsidy. In 1986, the rates of subsidy on urea and TSP were at 35 and 55 percent, 
respectively, relative to border prices adjusted to the farm level (IFPRI and CAER 
report, 1987). In addition to setting farm level fertilizer prices, the government is 
heavily involved in the production, trade, and distribution of fe:..tilizers. All domestic 
fertilizers are produced by government-owned plants, and imports and exports of 
fertilizer are controlled by the government. Domestic distribution is monopolized 
by the government to the wholesale level. Some Indonesian fertilizer plants are highly 
competitive internationally and export urea profitably. Others, however, are 
relatively high cost producers. The domestic fertilizer distribution is relatively in-
efficient, burdened by costly regulations and cumbersome distribution channels 
(Ministry of Agriculture of Indonesia, 1987). As a result, substantial subsidies are 
also paid for the production and distribution of fertilizers so that the farm price 
can be maintained. 
Given the heavy burden of the fertilizer subsidies, and large cutbacks in the 
government budget, there is considerable discussion in government regarding possible . 
reduction or complete elimination of the fertilizer subsidy. A phase out of the 
Indonesian-fertilizer subsidy is simulated by an increase in the weighed price of urea 
and TSP from Rp 125 per Kg to Rp 210 per Kg or an increase by· 60 percent of 
fertilizer cost (IFPRI report 1987, page 6.15). 
Here the effect of this policy reform will be analyzed by increasing the input 
cost i) by about 40 percent if the fertilizer cost is 60 percent of input cost, ii) 30 
percent if the fertilizer cost is 50 percent of input cost, and iii) 20 percent if 
fertilizer cost is 40 percent of input cost. 
iv) Sugarcane price and trade policy 
Since 1980 the government has controlled the domestic production and 
marketing of sugar and also controlled sugar imports to maintain sugar prices. The 
sugar industry has enjoyed protection as high as 200 percent in 1985, and in 1987, 
the nominal protection rate was still 75 percent after devaluation in 1983 (IFPRI 
report 1987, p. 7.14). The sugar production program on Java permits cane farmers, 
who were previously required to rent land to sugar mills, to farm their own land. 
The farmers, however, are in tum obligated to cultivate cane on this land and sell 
their entire crop to designated mills. As payment, farmers receive the proceeds of 
60- 65 percent of the total sugar produced from their cane, depending on the sugar 
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content. Although this new cultivation system has improved farmer control over 
management of their land, the system also retained area quotas to deliver targeted 
amount of cane production to the mills. In addition to this direct intervention .in 
sugar production, the government has a monopoly on procurement, marketing, and 
distribution of sugar. BULOG (Badan Urusan Logistik: National Logistic Agency) 
purchases all sugar from the factories at a special quotation price determined by 
the government based on production costs, and "reasonable" consumer price levels. 
BULOG then distributes sugar to private wholesalers across the country. Retail 
prices are set to cover the ex-factory quotation price plus BULOG's, wholesalers' 
and retailers' transportation and storage costs, plus a "reasonable" profit margin 
for wholesalers and local retailers. The highly protected prices are maintained by 
government control over imports. 
Within the policy analysis, three alternative policies are considered. First the 
share of sugarcane farmers in total sugar produced is increased from 60 percent 
to 70 percent. Then, the above policy is coupled with price adjustment, where the 
domestic sugar price is reduced to its world price equivalent. The third policy 
alternative is the same as the previous alternative but together with establishment 
of a 20 percent import tariff. Establishment of a moderate tariff represents a move 
toward full liberalization, and reduces the incentive-distorting effects of maintaining 
different and variable levels of protection. Such a tariff would be a relatively 
progressive tax, since consumption of sugar is much larger among high income 
groups (IFPRI report 1987, p. 7.15). 
THE RESULTS 
Effects of Varying Interest Rate 
The results show that increasing the interest rate to market interest rate( 30 
percent per annum), does not affect rice production, while the production of all 
other crops decreases except sugarcane production increased by 1 percent. An 
increase in sugarcane can be explained by the changed relative profitability across 
crops and reduced operating capital to cover production expenses (this latter fact 
is because of paying the interest rate at the time credit placement). This makes . 
profitable crop and large farms, being equipped with a better financial situation, 
continue to grow evenmore cane. As a consequence, production of other crops were 
slightly decreased causing an increase in food crop prices except rice price and 
sugarcane price (the latter was kept constant at the exogenous price). 
The economic consequences of the above experiments are displayed in Table 
1. The price endogenous sector model indicated that increasing the interest rate would 
significantly affect the crop production pattern, gross production value, sectoral 
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Table 1. Indexed economic consequences under varying interest rate. 
Base PI P2 P3 
Gross production value: 
at endogenous prices 100 110.0 104.4 102.3 
at constant prices 100 97.9 98.8 99.1 
Income by farm*): 
Small Farms 100 115.1 106.8 103.4 
Large Farms 100 121.9 109.9 105.5 
Sectoral income: 
at endogenous prices 100 118.9 108.5 104.5 
at constant prices 100 92.7 93.7 94.0 
Consumer's surplus 100 95.0 97.7 98.7 
Producer's surplus 100 130.6 114.0 107.7 
Social sUrplus 100 100.1 99.9 99.7 
. Notes: PI refers to increasing the interest rate to 30 percent a year; 
P2 refers to increasing the interest rate to 21 percent a year; 
P3 refers to increasing the interest rate to 18 percent a year. 
*) calculated at endogenous prices. 
income, and producers' and consumers' surplus. This policy reform not only 
improved the overall contribution of the sector, but also caused redistribution of 
welfare (Darmawan, D.H.A., 1991). The crop production pattern shifted from 
growing basic food crops toward commercial crops (mostly sugarcane). A higher 
interest rate caused reallocation of institutional credit between farm groups. Small 
farms obtained a larger share and produced more sugarcane, while large farms were 
discouraged to produce this cash intensive crop. Overall, this policy reform increased 
the sectoral income mainly due to increased sugarcane production. 
Effects of Varying the Loan Size 
Experiments with altered distribution of institutional credits revealed interesting 
outcomes. A 10 percent increase in the loan size to all farms slightly decreased the 
net income of large farms, while increasing the net income of small farms, and left 
the social surplus unchanged, unless this policy combined with the varying interest 
rate. Varying the loan size, combined with the increased interest rate, made con-
sumers worse off while producers benefitted (see Table 2). This was mainly due 
to the altered crop pattern. A higher credit share made available to small farms 
motivated them to produce more sugarcane instead of renting more land from large 
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Table 2. Indexed economic consequences under varying the loan size. 
Base P4 P5 P6 P7 
Gross product value: 
at endogenous prices 100 99.5 99.8 99.5 105.9 
at constant prices 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.6 
Income by farm*): 
Small Farms 100 100.5 109.6 99.5 109.4 
Large Farms 100 98.7 99.6 102.3 112.7 
Sectoral income: 
at endogenous prices 100 99.5 100.1 99.2 111.2 
at constant prices 100 100.1 100.0 100.1 98.5 
Consumer's surplus 100 100.2 100.1 100.2 97.1 
Producer's surplus 100 98.4 99.4 98.6 118.0 
Social surplus 100 100.1 99.9 100.0 99.8 
Notes: P4 refers to 10 per\.'ent increase of the amount of loan to all farm sizes with subsidized interest rate; · 
P5 refers to 10 percent increase of the amount of loan to small farm with subsidized interest rate; 
P6 refers to 10 percent increase of the amount of loan to large farm with subsidized interest rate; 
P7 refers to 10 percent increase of the amount of loan to all farm sizes with market interest rate. 
farms. This concurrently increased the prices of other crops (the price of sugarcane 
remained constant). On the other hand, increasing the loan limit to small farms 
only increased their net income without seriously disturbing the large farms' net 
income, while the overall producers' and consumers' surplus remained almost un-
changed (Darmawan, D.H.A., 1991). 
Effect of Varying Input Cost 
Another set of experiments changed the fertilizer subsidy which has been 
employed by the government as a key instrument to stimulate crop production, 
particularly rice. However, the rapid growth in fertilizer use, induced in part by 
subsidy, has sharply increased the budgetary burden of the subsidy. Empirical 
results obtained from the model by altering the subsidy rate demonstrated that 
reducing or removing the fertilizer subsidy which caused increases in input cost, 
slightly reduced rice production. Consequently, consumers suffered, because they 
had to pay higher prices (determined endogenously) while producers gained because 
they received higher prices for producing both rice and other crops. 
The results, as presented in Table 3, shed some light on an important policy 
issue. It is often argued that agricultural subsidy is a bonus to large farms 
(Darmawan, D.H.A., 1991). The results obtained from the model indicated that 
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Table 3. Indexed economic consequences under varying fertilizer subsidy. 
Base P8· P9 P10 
Gross product value: 
at endogenous prices 100 101.5 104.9 97.8 
at constant prices 100 97.5 98.7 95.9 
Income by farm*): 
Small Farms 100 102.2 108.4 95.5 
Large Farms 100 104.7 109.1 100.2 
Sectoral income: 
at endogenous prices 100 103.6 108.8 98.1 
at constant prices 100 96.6 98.1 94.8 
Consumer's surplus 100 98.5 97.5 99.4 
Producer's surplus 100 108.7 115.7 101.5 
Social surplus 100 101.3 100.5 102.4 
Notes: P8 refers to 20 percent fertilizer subsidy; 
P9 refers to 30 percent fertilizer subsidy; 
P10 refers to no subsidy alternative. 
*) calculated at endogenous prices. 
this is not totally true as both farm groups are affected at quite proportional rates 
(small farms even loose under PlO while large farms are not much affected). An 
equally important demonstration is that consumers are also beneficiaries of the 
input subsidy, because wt:Uare losses occur when subsidy is reduced. Thus, all farm 
groups and consumers are target groups when subsidy is of concern. 
Effects of Varying Sugar Policy 
The last set of policy experiments involved changes in sugarcane policy. The 
effect of increasing the farmers' share in processed sugar revenue from 60 percent 
to 70 percent significantly increased sugarcane production, while production of other 
food crops was drastically decreased. This caused an increase in other food crop 
prices, as high as 20 percent. This policy significantly raised producers' surplus, 
because sugarcane farmers benefitted from higher cane price while other food crop 
producers benefitted from higher prices of other food crops. 
This policy reform, however, significantly reduced consumers' surplus, because 
they had to pay higher prices for other food crops and pay the same for sugarcane. 
When this policy alternative was combined with a reduction of sugar price to the 
world market price, sugarcane production significantly decreased, while the pro-
duction of other crops increased (except rice production, which remain unchanged). 
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These results (see Table 4) were expected, because decreasing sugarcane production 
allows sugarcane land be transferred to produce other food crops. The analysis 
under this policy reform showed that this policy alternative generated slight gains 
for consumers, because they could enjoy lower crop prices, while producers' welfare 
was not affected. Given the government's concern about farm income, and knowing 
that domestic sugarcane producers may not be ready to compete in the world market, 
a 20 percent import tariff on sugar import price was imposed in an experiment as 
a possible alternative to lessen the adverse effects of the reduced price policy. The 
analysis showed that consumers' gains from previous policy are reduced, but the 
negative effect of the previous policy on net farm revenues is also reduced. 
Table 4. Indexed economic consequences under varying sugarcane policy. 
Base P11 P12 P13 
Gross product value: 
at endogenous prices 100 124.4 95.8 100.6 
at contant prices 100 109.0 97.4 100.1 
Income by farm*): 
Small Farms 100 137.2 95.5 102.9 
Large Farms 100 145.5 93.9 100.7 
Sectoral income: 
at endogenous prices 100 139.8 93.4 101.3 
at constant prices 100 114.1 96.1 100.7 
Consumer's surplus 100 93.1 100.1 99.8 
Producer's surplus 100 154.5 91.5 99.5 
Social's surplus 100 96.9 101.0 99.9 
Notes: P11 refers to increase of cane farmer share to 70 percent; 
P12 refers to increase of cane farmer share to 70 percent but world sugar prices are employed; 
Pl3 refers to using world prices of sugar, but imposing a 20 per~nt of imports tariff. 
•) calculated at endogenous prices. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In general, results of alternative policies suggest that the following policies 
may enhance the performance of both the food production sector and loan dis-
tribution in East Java: 
(1) increase the interest rate for institutional loans; 
(2) increase the loan limit to small farms; 
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(3) decrease input, especially fertilizer, subsidies; and 
(4) reform the sugar policy by reducing the sugar price to a level between the world 
price and the current support price. 
From a methodological point of view, the study leads to a decision making 
model for resource allocation problem for East Java agricultural sector. In substance, 
the study generates a set of policy decisions that could be implemented by the 
government to improve the sector's performance. 
It was shown, using the price endogenous sector model, that significant changes 
in the structure of the East Java agricultural sector could occur as a result of various 
alternative policies. In particular, prices endogenously determined in the model lead 
to reallocation of resources used in the sector, on which basic crops and commercial 
crops compete. Prices not only allocate resources, but also generate income. 
Alternative policies significantly affect the distribution of income among farm 
groups. Because net incomes of farm groups are generally altered in different 
directions, direct or indirect income transfers to losing farm group(s) can occur with 
the policy change. 
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